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Justice Souter on Government Speech  
Sheldon Nahmod 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice David Souter, who replaced Justice William Brennan, was 
seated on October 3, 1990, and retired on June 29, 2009. As it 
turns out, Justice Souter’s tenure coincided exactly with the birth 
and development of the government speech doctrine1 in the 
Supreme Court. Rust v. Sullivan2 was handed down in 1991, and 
the most recent case, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,3 was handed 
down in 2009. 
Justice Souter provided the fifth vote in Rust, generally regarded 
as the seminal government speech case,4 and was thus present at the 
creation of the government speech doctrine. He joined the majority 
in Rust, a decision he may have come to regret,5 but did not write an 
                                                                                                           
  Copyright, 2010. Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
A.B., U. of Chicago; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A. Religious Studies, U. of Chicago 
Divinity School. I thank Moshe Marvit, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Class of 2010, for his 
invaluable assistance on an early draft of this Article and for our many conversations on 
government speech. I also thank the Brigham Young University Law Review for inviting me to 
participate in this symposium on government speech. 
 1. When speech falls within the category of government speech, it is immunized from 
any meaningful First Amendment free speech scrutiny, as the cases discussed in this Article 
illustrate. The government becomes a “market participant” in the marketplace of ideas rather 
than a regulator of that marketplace, analogous to the dormant Commerce Clause immunity of 
state and local governments when they are market participants. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap 
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809–10 (1976). 
 2. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Later, I suggest that the self-government rationale of the First 
Amendment might do a better job of accounting for Justice Souter’s concerns with the 
government speech doctrine than the marketplace of ideas rationale. See discussion infra pp. 
2110–11. 
 3. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
 4. The term “government speech” does not appear in Rust. However, as pointed out 
in Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (citations omitted), discussed 
infra p. 2107, “The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the 
counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when 
interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on this 
understanding.” 
 5. Interestingly, his predecessor, Justice Brennan, came to regret his early opinion and 
vote in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), dealing with obscenity doctrine. See Paris 
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I am convinced 
that the approach initiated 16 years ago in Roth . . . , and culminating in the Court’s decision 
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opinion. In contrast, in almost every subsequent government speech-
related case, Justice Souter wrote concurrences or dissents that 
demonstrated a deep engagement with the doctrine. Over the course 
of his tenure on the Court, his views evolved along with those of the 
Court as he became increasingly sensitive to the Court’s expanding 
use of the doctrine.  
His position ultimately reflected several major concerns that 
lower courts and academic commentators continue to explore: the 
definition and scope of government speech, the closely related 
question of political accountability, and the interplay between the 
government speech doctrine and the Establishment Clause. For 
example, who decides whether it is the government that is speaking 
and what it is saying? What standards does the decision maker use for 
that decision? Why should government speech be immunized from 
First Amendment free speech scrutiny? And isn’t there the potential 
of considerable tension between the government speech doctrine 
and the Establishment Clause? 
This Article is modest in scope and primarily descriptive. I 
propose to address each of the nine Supreme Court decisions in 
which government speech is discussed either by the Court or by 
Justice Souter, with an emphasis on Justice Souter’s often differing 
and cautionary observations about the doctrine. I do not engage 
here at a normative level with the government speech doctrine, even 
though I am worried about the Court’s increasing use of the 
doctrine to avoid difficult First Amendment issues.  
II. BIRTH AND UNCERTAIN BEGINNINGS: RUST AND ROSENBERGER  
Oral argument in Rust v. Sullivan was held on October 30, 
1990, which made Rust one of the first cases that Justice Souter 
heard.6 In a 5-4 vote that almost certainly would have gone the other 
way had Justice Brennan still been on the Court, the Court, in an 
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld federal regulations that 
prohibited doctors from engaging in abortion counseling as part of a 
federally funded Title X project.7 
The ruling rested on the distinction between a subsidy and a 
restriction. The Court began with the premise that government may 
                                                                                                           
today, cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental First 
Amendment values.” (citations omitted)). 
 6. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 173. 
 7. Id. at 177. 
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choose to fund one activity to the exclusion of another, even if the 
latter involves the exercise of a fundamental right.8 It then 
determined that Rust was not an “unconstitutional conditions” case 
because Title X focused on the project rather than the grantee.9 Title 
X did not absolutely restrict the recipients of funding from engaging 
in pro-abortion activities; it merely mandated that Title X projects 
not include such activities.10 Therefore, if a doctor wished to go 
beyond the scope of a Title X program, he or she remained free to 
do so. Title X merely required that the funds for Title X projects be 
segregated from funds used to support activities beyond the scope 
allowed by Title X.11  
Four justices dissented.12 “Until today, the Court never has 
upheld viewpoint-based suppression of speech simply because that 
suppression was a condition upon the acceptance of public funds.”13 
For Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, what distinguished 
Rust from Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,14 
which dealt with funding coupled with conditions, was that Title X 
was in part aimed at the suppression of “dangerous ideas.”15 Because 
the counseling and referral provisions in Title X were both content- 
and viewpoint-based, they violated the First Amendment.16 These 
three dissenters further argued that the majority’s mantra that 
government is free to fund one activity to the exclusion of another 
was overly simplistic and not correct.  
Clearly, there are some bases upon which government may not rest 
its decision to fund or not to fund. For example, the Members of 
the majority surely would agree that government may not base its 
decision to support an activity upon considerations of race. As 
                                                                                                           
 8. Id. at 182. 
 9. Id. at 196. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justice Marshall and by Justice Stevens in part 
and by Justice O’Connor in part. Id. at 203–04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor 
separately dissented, arguing that it was not necessary for either the Court or the other 
dissenters to reach the First Amendment issues. Id. at 223–24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 14. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). The Court here upheld a content-neutral provision of the 
Internal Revenue Code that disallowed tax-exempt status to organizations that attempted to 
influence legislation while at the same time giving such status to veterans’ organizations 
regardless of their lobbying activities. Id. at 546–48. 
 15. Rust, 500 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 16. Id. 
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demonstrated above, our cases make clear that ideological 
viewpoint is a similarly repugnant ground upon which to base 
funding decisions.17  
A further problem with the Title X restrictions, according to 
these three dissenters, was that the women counseled would view the 
speech as originating with their doctors rather than as speech from 
the government.18 Most people assumed that, when they spoke with 
their doctors concerning private medical issues, the views and advice 
offered were the doctors’ own and not those of the government or 
another third party.19 
Justice Souter’s agreement with the Rust majority, rather than 
with the dissenters, can serve as an important starting point that 
shows just how much his views of government speech changed over 
the next eighteen years. An issue raised by the Rust dissenters—that 
a reasonable patient in a Title X program would not view the speech 
as government speech—subsequently became one of Justice Souter’s 
primary concerns with the doctrine. As the doctrine developed, and 
as Justice Souter focused more on the political accountability 
necessary to control government speech, the reasonable observer test 
became increasingly central in his approach to the doctrine.20  
For example, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, Justice 
Souter’s focus on how the speech was viewed by a reasonable 
observer led him to conclude that the speech at issue there did not 
constitute government speech.21 And in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum,22 Justice Souter concurred in the judgment that the 
permanent Ten Commandments statue in the park of Pleasant Grove 
City constituted government speech because a reasonable observer 
                                                                                                           
 17. Id. at 210–11 (citations omitted). 
 18. Id. at 217. 
 19. Id. With regards to unconstitutional conditions, the dissent argued that the Court in 
Rust embraced a principle that had been discarded with the rights-privileges distinction, 
namely, that “the First Amendment could be read to tolerate any governmental restriction 
upon an employee’s speech so long as that restriction is limited to the funded workplace.” Id. 
at 213. The dissent applied heightened scrutiny that the Title X regulations did not pass. 
 20. The reasonable observer test is a variation of Justice O’Connor’s Establishment 
Clause endorsement test as set out initially in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 
(O’Connor, J., concurring), which dealt with government display of religious symbols. 
 21. 544 U.S. 550, 577–78 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting), discussed infra pp. 2108–10. 
 22. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009), discussed infra pp. 
2113–16. 
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would know that the monument’s moral and religious message was 
the government’s own.23 
In 1995, four years after Rust, the Court held in Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia24 that a public 
university’s refusal to fund a student magazine with a Christian 
theme25 at the same time it was funding other student organizations 
was a violation of the First Amendment. The Court found that the 
student activity fund from which the Christian magazine was 
applying for funds was a “metaphysical” limited public forum that 
was intended to enable private speech and, as such, could not 
discriminate according to viewpoint.26 Though the university argued 
that it was discriminating according to content (permitted in a 
limited public forum), the Court rejected this argument and 
effectively held that religious belief was a viewpoint.27  
Rosenberger is often cited for its broad language describing the 
government speech doctrine implicit in Rust,28 even though 
Rosenberger was not a government speech case: the university had 
expressly stated that it was not its own speech that was at issue.29 In 
fact, one of the requirements imposed on student organizations for 
receiving funding was signing a disclaimer that distanced the 
university from the speech of the recipients.30 
Justice Souter’s dissent, therefore, focused primarily on the 
Establishment Clause and why a government’s financial 
contributions to a Christian magazine violated the central 
                                                                                                           
 23. Id. at 1141. 
 24. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, with Justices O’Connor 
and Thomas writing separate concurring opinions. Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 822. 
 25. The Court described the group at issue as a student news organization with a 
Christian editorial viewpoint rather than as a religious organization in response to the 
university’s argument that the group was a religious organization, and that funding such 
organizations was therefore inconsistent with the guidelines of the school’s funding program. 
Id. at 840.  
 26. Id. at 830–31. 
 27. Id. at 833. 
 28. “We recognized [in Rust] that when the government appropriates public funds to 
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes. When the government 
disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take 
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by 
the grantee.” Id. at 833 (citations omitted). 
 29. Id. at 830. 
 30. Id. at 823–24. 
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prohibition of the Establishment Clause.31 However, in an important 
footnote, Justice Souter articulated for the first time his concern with 
properly identifying government speech.32 While he agreed that 
Rosenberger did not involve government speech, he pointed to a 
problem that would arise later for the Court: what speech should be 
analyzed in assessing whether it is the government speaking.33 Was 
the speech at issue the initial funding because funding has a 
communicative element analogous to speech? Or was it the ultimate 
speech that was being funded?  
In other words, Justice Souter questioned how far beyond pure 
speech the government speech doctrine extended. If it applied to the 
initial funding, then the exception would swallow the rule, making 
forum analysis and other First Amendment analysis exceptionally 
narrow. As government had funded most of the forums that were at 
issue, it could argue that this initial funding immunized the matter 
from First Amendment review, with the result that government 
could discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in almost any case. On 
the other hand, if the doctrine related only to pure speech such that 
the government was communicating directly through official 
channels—for example, legislation—then the doctrine said nothing 
new. The difficulty was in drawing the line between these two 
extreme positions, and in this footnote Justice Souter put the Court 
on notice. In so doing, he anticipated the possible intrusion of the 
government speech doctrine on forum analysis.  
At this juncture, it is worth making an analytical observation. In 
retrospect, Rust and Rosenberger represent two very different and 
important categories in government speech jurisprudence. Rust was a 
case in which the Court determined that it was the government that 
                                                                                                           
 31. Id. at 863–64 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. at 892–93 n.11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The Court draws a distinction between 
a State’s use of public funds to advance its own speech and the State’s funding of private 
speech, suggesting that authority to make content-related choices is at its most powerful when 
the State undertakes the former. I would not argue otherwise, but I do suggest that this case 
reveals the difficulties that can be encountered in drawing this distinction. There is a 
communicative element inherent in the very act of funding itself, and although it is the student 
speakers who choose which particular messages to advance in the forum created by the 
University, the initial act of defining the boundaries of the forum is a decision attributable to 
the University, not the students. In any event, even assuming that private and state speech 
always may be separated by clean lines and that this case involves only the former, I believe the 
distinction is irrelevant here because, as is discussed infra, this case does not involve viewpoint 
discrimination.” (citations omitted)). 
 33. See id. 
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was speaking, with the result that the First Amendment prohibition 
on viewpoint discrimination was inapplicable.34 In contrast, 
Rosenberger was a case in which the Court determined that the 
government itself was not speaking; rather, it was enabling private 
speech.35 Here, the result was that conventional First Amendment 
forum doctrine was indeed applicable. The decision of which 
category the particular challenged governmental act fell into was thus 
to become outcome-determinative, as it was, for example, in Legal 
Services Corp. v. Velazquez.36 
III. ADOLESCENCE: GLICKMAN, FINLEY, SOUTHWORTH, AND 
LEGAL SERVICES CORP. 
In the 1997 case Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.,37 
the Court held that an assessment imposed by the Secretary of 
Agriculture on fruit growers for generic advertisements did not 
violate the First Amendment.38 The Court explained:  
First, the marketing orders impose no restraint on the freedom of 
any producer to communicate any message to any audience. 
Second, they do not compel any person to engage in any actual or 
symbolic speech. Third, they do not compel the producers to 
endorse or to finance any political or ideological views.39  
Justice Souter dissented,40 arguing that the Central Hudson41 test 
applied to such compelled commercial speech and that the 
assessment failed the test.42 Again in a footnote, Justice Souter raised 
the government speech doctrine only to say that the government had 
never argued that it was applicable in Glickman.43 Perhaps indicative 
of his growing discomfort with the government speech doctrine, 
however, Justice Souter did not describe the doctrine in expansive 
                                                                                                           
 34. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1990). 
 35. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 821. 
 36. 531 U.S. 533 (2001), discussed infra pp. 2107–08, where Rosenberger controlled, 
not Rust. 
 37. 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
 38. Id. at 469–70. 
 39. Id. (citations omitted). 
 40. Id. at 477 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined by Chief Justice and 
Justice Scalia, and joined in part by Justice Thomas. Id. 
 41. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 42. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 491–92 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 482 n.2. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/8/2011 4:51 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
2104 
terms, but rather said that the doctrine meant only that “the 
Government may have greater latitude in selecting content than 
otherwise permissible under the First Amendment.”44  
One year later, in NEA v. Finley,45 the Court, in an opinion by 
Justice O’Connor, held that a federal statute requiring that grants 
made by the National Endowment for the Arts take into 
consideration whether a project was “indecent” or “disrespectful” 
did not facially violate the First Amendment.46 One of the issues 
taken up by Justice Souter in dissent was his vigorous disagreement 
with the broad proposition set out in Justice Scalia’s concurrence 
that this case involved government subsidies of speech that were 
beyond the scope of the First Amendment because, according to 
Justice Scalia, such subsidies could never constitute an abridgement 
of anyone’s speech.47 
More to the present point, Justice Souter went on to observe in 
Finley that the government had disavowed any claim that it was 
speaking through its NEA grants.48 In his view, the government was 
not a market participant either as speaker or as buyer—both of these 
roles receive special treatment under the First Amendment—but 
rather was a patron “financially underwriting the production of art 
by private artists and impresarios for independent consumption.”49 
Accordingly, for Justice Souter, Rosenberger controlled this case and 
the government was thus engaged in impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination.50 
In 2000, two years after Finley, Board of Regents of the University 
of Wisconsin System v. Southworth51 presented a fact pattern similar to 
                                                                                                           
 44. Id. (citations omitted). 
 45. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). As noted, Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority. Justice 
Ginsburg joined in part, while Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the 
judgment. Justice Souter alone dissented. Id. at 571. 
 46. Id. at 572–73. 
 47. Id. at 598–99 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 48. Id. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. For Justice Souter, then, when government acts as patron, it is not engaged in 
government speech and is thus not immune from the generally applicable First Amendment 
rule prohibiting viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 611–12. 
Recall that in Rosenberger, Justice Souter spoke tentatively about the question of 
whether or when initial government funding could be characterized as government speech. See 
discussion supra pp. 2101–02. For Justice Souter, this issue was unavoidable in Finley because 
government, in funding artistic projects, acts as a patron financially underwriting private speech 
intended for independent consumption. Finley, 524 U.S. at 611–12 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 51. 529 U.S. 217 (2000). Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. Justice Souter, joined 
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the one the Court had addressed in Rosenberger. This time, though, 
the First Amendment issue was raised by students who were being 
“taxed” to fund the speech of student organizations.52 In 
Southworth, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that a 
mandatory student activity fee assessed on students to support 
student organizations did not violate the First Amendment rights of 
students who objected to the political and ideological speech of 
certain funded organizations.53 Southworth was essentially a 
compelled speech/subsidy case, because the university had expressly 
declared that its disbursement of funds was not government speech. 
The Court therefore did not engage in government speech analysis.54  
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy did discuss the government speech 
doctrine and its possible justification. He suggested that had 
Southworth involved government speech, it would have been outside 
the bounds of First Amendment scrutiny because political 
accountability, rather than judicial review, served to limit the 
government.55 “When the government speaks, for instance to 
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the 
end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its 
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could 
espouse some different or contrary position.”56  
Justice Kennedy’s brief discussion of political accountability in 
Southworth represents an early instance—perhaps the first— in which 
a member of the Court attempted to ground the government speech 
doctrine jurisprudentially.57 In subsequent cases, as will be seen, this 
concern with political accountability would become central for 
Justice Souter. 
Concurring in the judgment in Southworth, Justice Souter agreed 
that the case did not implicate government speech.58 But, he was 
uncomfortable with the Court’s apparent deference to, and reliance 
on, the university for that determination.59 Interestingly, his 
                                                                                                           
by Justices Stevens and Breyer, concurred in the judgment. Id. at 236. 
 52. Id. at 220. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 234–35. 
 55. Id. at 235. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 239–43 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 59. Id. at 241 n.8 (“Unlike the majority, I would not hold that the mere fact that the 
University disclaims speech as its own expression takes it out of the scope of our jurisprudence 
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reluctance in Southworth to rely exclusively on government assertions 
for government speech purposes is reminiscent of that of Justice 
Kennedy himself, the author of Southworth, in connection with 
designated public forums. Justice Kennedy, concurring in 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,60 maintained 
that in deciding whether government property is a designated public 
forum, the Court should not merely rely on the government’s 
statement of its purpose, but rather on how the government has 
actually treated the space.61 “In my view, the inquiry must be an 
objective one, based on the actual, physical characteristics and uses of 
the property.”62 Justice Kennedy worried that government has 
incentives to claim that its property is not a designated public forum 
because of the costs of compliance with the First Amendment.63  
Here is how Justice Kennedy put it there: 
If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at 
issue and the actual public access and uses that have been 
permitted by the government indicate that expressive activity 
would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the 
property is a public forum. The most important 
considerations in this analysis are whether the property shares 
physical similarities with more traditional public forums, 
whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in 
broad public access to the property, and whether expressive 
activity would tend to interfere in a significant way with the 
uses to which the government has as a factual matter 
dedicated the property.64  
In Southworth, Justice Souter applied analogous concerns to 
government speech because here, too, there were comparable 
incentives for government to avoid First Amendment scrutiny.65 For 
him, whether the First Amendment applies should not turn simply 
on whether the government has identified the speech as its own or 
disclaimed it; that is, what the government says about the speech 
                                                                                                           
on government directed speech.”). 
 60. 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. Justice Souter joined the first part of this concurrence, the part relevant to the 
present discussion. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 695–99. 
 64. Id. at 698–99. 
 65. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 241 n.8 
(Souter, J., concurring). 
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after the fact should not be dispositive.66 However, Justice Souter did 
not explain in any detail in Southworth how the Court should 
determine whether the government was in fact the speaker. 
Subsequently, in making this determination, he would shift the focus 
from the government’s assertions to the perspective of the reasonable 
observer.67 
In the Term following Southworth, the Court held in Legal 
Services Corp. v. Velazquez that a federal statute violated the First 
Amendment because it broadly restricted recipients of Legal Services 
Corporation funds from providing legal representation that involved 
an effort to amend or challenge existing welfare laws, even if that 
legal representation was separately funded.68 Writing for the Court 
(including Justice Souter), Justice Kennedy explained and then 
distinguished Rust:  
The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the 
rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under 
Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting 
the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust 
on this understanding. We have said that viewpoint-based 
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the 
government is itself the speaker, or instances, like Rust, in 
which the government “used private speakers to transmit 
specific information pertaining to its own program.”69 
However, according to the Court, not every government subsidy 
creates a government speech scenario.70 Where, as in Legal Services 
Corp., government subsidizes individuals and groups for the purpose 
of facilitating private speech, forum analysis is appropriate just as it 
was in Rosenberger.71 In these situations, when there is no 
“programmatic message,” the government may not discriminate on 
the basis of viewpoint.72 In the course of its opinion, the Court also 
emphasized the distorting effects of the funding condition on the 
                                                                                                           
 66. Id.  
 67. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 577 (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
 68. 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, dissented. Id. at 549.  
 69. Id. at 541 (citations omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
 70. Id. at 542. 
 71. Id. at 542–44. 
 72. Id. at 548. 
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adversary system and the legal process.73 For these reasons, the 
statute violated the First Amendment.74 
IV. COMING OF AGE: JOHANNS, GARCETTI, AND SUMMUM  
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,75 handed down in 2005, 
generated important doctrinal developments in government speech 
doctrine. Here, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, ruled that 
mandatory assessments on beef producers that were used to 
disseminate the advertisement, “Beef, it’s what’s for dinner,” did not 
violate the First Amendment because the advertisement constituted 
government speech.76 Johanns was very similar factually to an earlier 
case, United States v. United Foods,77 which had held that a 
government assessment on mushroom growers for generic 
advertisements was compelled speech forbidden by the First 
Amendment.78 But, unlike in United Foods, in Johanns the 
government argued that the advertisements were government speech 
since the Secretary of Agriculture exercised final control over the 
message.79  
Johanns presented the Court with its first real opportunity to 
consider the free speech implications of the government speech 
doctrine when it involved compelled speech.80 The Court held that 
the federal statute authorizing the speech, accompanied by 
government control of the message, rendered the advertisement 
government speech.81 As a result, the compelled nature of the speech 
did not make a significant difference in the analysis because 
government has the right to tax and spend.82 Furthermore, it did not 
                                                                                                           
 73. Id. at 544. 
 74. Id. at 549. 
 75. 544 U.S. 550 (2005). Justice Breyer concurred, Justice Ginsburg concurred in the 
judgment, Justice Kennedy dissented, and Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and 
Kennedy, dissented. 
 76. Id. at 557–67. 
 77. 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
 78. Id. at 415–16. 
 79. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–62. 
 80. While the Glickman case, set out supra Part III, similarly involved an assessment and 
dealt with compelled speech, government speech was not addressed because the government 
did not make a government speech argument. 
 81. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–62. 
 82. Id. at 559. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/8/2011 4:51 PM 
2097 Justice Souter on Government Speech 
 2109 
matter for First Amendment purposes whether the speech was 
facilitated through a general tax or through a targeted assessment.83  
Justice Souter dissented on the ground that this was not an 
instance of government speech at all.84 In his view, “the Court ha[d] 
it backwards.”85 The First Amendment focus should be neither on 
whether government stated that the speech was government speech, 
nor on government control of the speech.86 Rather, it should be on 
whether a reasonable observer viewed it as government speech.87 In 
Johanns, there was no way for a reasonable observer to know that it 
was the government speaking.88  
To the contrary, two factors indicated to Justice Souter that it 
was not the government speaking when the advertisement was 
distributed. First, the advertisements included the tagline, “funded 
by America’s Beef Producers.”89 A reasonable observer who read this 
tagline would conclude that a group of private parties was behind the 
advertisement.90 Second, the government’s Dietary Guidelines for 
2005 (which surely constituted government speech) carried the 
message that Americans should eat less beef.91 Here the government 
would be advancing seemingly contradictory messages if the 
advertisement constituted government speech.92  
Justice Souter, referring to “the requirement of effective public 
accountability,” emphasized the importance of government clearly 
holding itself out as the speaker; the primary justification for 
exempting government speech from First Amendment scrutiny is 
that the political process keeps the speech in check.93 “Democracy, in 
other words, ensures that government is not untouchable when its 
                                                                                                           
 83. Id. at 562. 
 84. Id. at 580 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 578. 
 86. Id. at 578–80. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 577–78. 
 89. Id. at 577. 
 90. Id. at 577–78. 
 91. Id. at 578 n.7. 
 92. Justice Scalia responded to Justice Souter’s latter argument by maintaining that the 
messages were not in fact contradictory: government could promote beef for dinner while at 
the same time encouraging Americans to limit their overall beef consumption. “The beef 
promotions are perfectly compatible with the guidelines’ message of moderate consumption—
the ads do not insist that beef is also What’s for Breakfast, Lunch, and Midnight Snack.” Id. at 
561 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 93. Id. at 577–78 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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speech rubs against the First Amendment interests of those who 
object to supporting it; if enough voters disagree with what 
government says, the next election will cancel the message.”94  
Justice Souter went on to offer a philosophical grounding of his 
own for the government speech doctrine. Citing the dissenting 
opinion of Justices Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis, in Abrams v. 
United States,95 he suggested that it was the “marketplace of ideas” 
rationale that made the government speech doctrine necessary.96 
Under this rationale, government has an important role as a 
participant in the marketplace of ideas in which there is a “free trade 
in ideas.”97 It would not be able to participate in that marketplace if 
citizens could use the First Amendment as a “heckler’s veto.”98 For 
these reasons, it was essential, according to Justice Souter, that the 
Court ensure that it was in fact the government speaking.99  
Here, one might wonder why Justice Souter, so concerned with 
government “subterfuge” and misleading of taxpayers “by 
concealing its sponsorship of expression,” relied on the marketplace 
of ideas rationale for the government speech doctrine.100 This 
rationale, at least in its pure form, assumes that every buyer and seller 
in the marketplace of ideas has the same opportunity to participate 
and that no single participant monopolizes that marketplace or 
distorts it by drowning out the ideas of others.101 Under this 
rationale, a significant role of government in the marketplace of ideas 
is that it be neutral. But government neutrality in the marketplace of 
ideas seems inconsistent with the government’s expression of its own 
views in that marketplace. Furthermore, government can potentially 
monopolize or distort the marketplace more readily than most 
private sellers of ideas.102  
                                                                                                           
 94. Id. at 575. 
 95. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 96. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 n.3 (citing Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)). The famous dissent in Abrams also articulated the “clear and present danger test” 
for speech that incites. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627–28 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 97. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 98. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 572–80. 
 100. Id. at 578–79 n.8. 
 101. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also JOHN STUART MILL, 
ON LIBERTY (1859) (articulating the search for truth rationale). 
 102. Indeed, the Court found government distortion of the relevant marketplace of ideas 
in Legal Services Corp. See supra Part III. 
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In contrast, the self-government rationale of the First 
Amendment espoused by Alexander Meiklejohn103 perhaps more 
persuasively addresses the importance of political accountability, 
particularly where government enlists the private sector in 
communicating its messages. This rationale, of necessity, confronts 
head-on the issue of government monopolization and distortion of 
the political process.104 It also strengthens Justice Souter’s argument 
about the crucial importance of government’s identifying itself as the 
speaker.  
In the next term, the Court, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,105 an 
exceptionally important public employee free speech case, held that a 
deputy district attorney’s First Amendment rights were not violated 
when he was allegedly retaliated against by his supervisors for writing 
a memo to them alleging problems in the prosecution of a criminal 
case.106 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy indicated that there 
was a government speech element present whenever public 
employees spoke pursuant to their official duties:  
The significant point is that the memo was written pursuant to 
Ceballos’ official duties. Restricting speech that owes its existence 
to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not 
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private 
citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what 
the employer itself has commissioned or created.107  
                                                                                                           
 103. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (2000). 
 104. Note, however, that the Court in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), 
was not seriously concerned with monopolizing and distorting of the electoral marketplace by 
unlimited expenditures by corporations and unions for (or against) candidates for federal 
office. 
 105. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, while Justices Stevens 
and Breyer dissented separately, and Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, 
also dissented. 
 106. Id. at 425–26.  
 107. Id. at 421–22 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 833 (1995) (“When the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular 
policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.”)). Garcetti modified the balancing test of 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
This test triggered First Amendment scrutiny whenever a public employee’s speech was on a 
matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140. In contrast, Garcetti imposed the 
threshold requirement that the speech must not be part of the employee’s duties. Garcetti, 547 
U.S. at 426. If the speech is part of the employee’s duties, the First Amendment is simply 
inapplicable, even where the speech is of the greatest public concern. Id. at 418–26. For an 
assessment of Garcetti, see Sheldon Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing 
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Here, as in Johanns, the Court was again willing to agree that the 
government’s message was whatever it said it was. In this case, the 
“policy” that the government was promoting determined the official 
duties of the employees it hired. 
In a vigorous dissent in which he attacked every aspect of the 
Court’s decision, Justice Souter criticized the Court’s reliance on the 
government speech rationale:  
The key to understanding the difference between this case and Rust 
lies in the terms of the respective employees’ jobs and, in particular, 
the extent to which those terms require espousal of a substantive 
position prescribed by the government in advance. Some public 
employees are hired to “promote a particular policy” by 
broadcasting a particular message set by the government, but not 
everyone working for the government, after all, is hired to speak 
from a government manifesto.108  
In order for the deputy district attorney’s memo to be 
government speech, Justice Souter argued that it would have had to 
set out a specific and substantive government message.109 Rust “is no 
authority for the notion that government may exercise plenary 
control over every comment made by a public employee in doing his 
job.”110 It was in this context that Justice Souter also expressed 
concern about academic freedom and the unintended effect that 
Garcetti could have on it.111 
In Garcetti, Justice Souter clearly saw the category of 
government speech colonizing more and more First Amendment 
jurisprudence: “The fallacy of the majority’s reliance on 
Rosenberger’s understanding of the Rust doctrine . . . portends a 
bloated notion of controllable government speech going well 
beyond the circumstances of this case.”112 His fear was that the 
Court in Garcetti had allowed the government speech doctrine and 
its consequent First Amendment immunity to extend to whatever 
the government said was its speech, without any requirement 
                                                                                                           
and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008). 
 108. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST 
AMENDMENT L. REV. 54 (2008). 
 112. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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imposed on government to announce in advance what that speech 
was.113 
Finally, in 2009, in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,114 the 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, held that government’s 
acceptance of a privately donated monument of the Ten 
Commandments for permanent display in a public park, while 
rejecting a monument offered by the Summum sect years later, did 
not violate the First Amendment as impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination since the Ten Commandments monument was 
government speech.115 In what seemed to parallel conventional 
public forum analysis,116 the Court looked to tradition and history to 
determine that the Ten Commandments monument was indeed 
government speech:  
Governments have long used monuments to speak to the public. 
Since ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rulers have erected 
statues of themselves to remind their subjects of their authority and 
power. Triumphal arches, columns, and other monuments have 
been built to commemorate military victories and sacrifices and 
other events of civic importance. A monument, by definition, is a 
structure that is designed as a means of expression. When a 
government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it 
does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some 
feeling in those who see the structure.117 
Then, in order to find that a reasonable observer would know 
that a monument on government land was necessarily representative 
of the government’s message, the Court analogized public property 
owners to other property owners: 
It certainly is not common for property owners to open up their 
property for the installation of permanent monuments that convey 
a message with which they do not wish to be associated. And 
because property owners typically do not permit the construction 
of such monuments on their land, persons who observe donated 
monuments routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as 
conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf. In this 
                                                                                                           
 113. See id. at 437–38. 
 114. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). Justice Alito wrote for the Court. Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justice Ginsburg, concurred, as did Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Breyer also 
concurred, while Justice Souter concurred in the judgment. 
 115. Id. at 1129. 
 116. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 117. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1132–33. 
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context, there is little chance that observers will fail to appreciate 
the identity of the speaker. This is true whether the monument is 
located on private property or on public property, such as national, 
state, or city park land.118 
Finally, the Court observed that a monument could be 
government speech even if it did not communicate a particular 
message. It said:  
This argument fundamentally misunderstands the way monuments 
convey meaning. The meaning conveyed by a monument is 
generally not a simple one like “‘Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.’” 
Even when a monument features the written word, the monument 
may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted 
by different observers, in a variety of ways. Monuments called to 
our attention by the briefing in this case illustrate this 
phenomenon. 
What, for example, is “the message” of the Greco-Roman mosaic 
of the word “Imagine” that was donated to New York City’s 
Central Park in memory of John Lennon? Some observers may 
“imagine” the musical contributions that John Lennon would have 
made if he had not been killed. Others may think of the lyrics of 
the Lennon song that obviously inspired the mosaic and may 
“imagine” a world without religion, countries, possessions, greed, 
or hunger.  
Or, to take another example, what is “the message” of the “large 
bronze statue displaying the word ‘peace’ in many world 
languages” that is displayed in Fayetteville, Arkansas?119 
In what would be his last judicial opinion dealing with 
government speech, Justice Souter concurred in the judgment in 
Summum.120 He agreed with the Court that government need not 
formally declare that particular expression was its own.121 But he was 
reluctant to maintain, as the Court apparently did, that monuments 
were categorically government speech.122 In his view, there were 
situations, such as sectarian identifications in Arlington Cemetery, 
where government acceptance and maintenance of monuments on 
                                                                                                           
 118. Id. at 1133. 
 119. Id. at 1135 (citations omitted). 
 120. Id. at 1141–42 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). 
 121. Id. at 1141. 
 122. Id. 
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public space would not “look like” government speech.123 In 
addition, because the government speech doctrine was “recently 
minted” the Court should move slowly in this area.124  
Furthermore, the government speech doctrine could interact in 
unexpected ways with the Establishment Clause.125 Justice Souter 
imagined a situation in which government erected a religiously 
themed monument and, to avoid violating the Establishment Clause, 
quickly surrounded it with other monuments.126 Though this would 
dilute the religious character of the initial monument, it would at the 
same time create so many messages that it was less obvious that 
government was speaking.127 In this situation, applying the 
government speech doctrine could potentially allow a government to 
discriminate among religious groups by favoring some over others, 
thereby evading the Establishment Clause: 
[T]he government could well argue, as a development of 
government speech doctrine, that when it expresses its own views, 
it is free of the Establishment Clause’s stricture against 
discriminating among religious sects or groups. Under this view of 
the relationship between the two doctrines, it would be easy for a 
government to favor some private religious speakers over others by 
the choice of monuments to accept.128 
Consequently, rather than adopting a rule that monuments 
accepted by government always constitute government speech, 
Justice Souter yet again suggested applying the reasonable observer 
test on a case-by-case basis when making the determination that it 
was the government speaking and communicating a particular 
message.129 Under this test, the question was “whether a reasonable 
and fully informed observer would understand the expression to be 
government speech, as distinct from private speech the government 
chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public 
land.”130 In Summum, according to Justice Souter, the Ten 
Commandments monument passed this test and thereby constituted 
                                                                                                           
 123. Id. at 1142. 
 124. Id. at 1141. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127.  Id. at 1141–42.  
 128. Id. at 1142. 
 129. Id. 
 130.  Id. 
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government speech: it was “an expression of a government’s position 
on the moral and religious issues raised by the subject of the 
monument.”131 Thus, he concurred in the judgment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Justice Souter could not have imagined in his first year on the 
Court that Rust, which he joined, would be transformed into the 
paradigmatic government speech case; nor could he have imagined 
where it would lead. As his views on government speech evolved, 
they became increasingly thoughtful, even if not daring and path-
breaking like the dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in the 
“clear and present danger test” years. Justice Souter was concerned 
with the adverse effects of expanding the scope of the government 
speech doctrine and consequently immunizing more and more 
government-directed speech from First Amendment scrutiny. Of 
particular interest here was his attempt, incomplete as it may have 
been, to ground the government speech doctrine on the marketplace 
of ideas rationale.  
More noteworthy doctrinally, though, was Justice Souter’s 
emphasis on political accountability and the related need to know 
that it is indeed government that is speaking and that there is a 
particular message. Finally, he warned of the need to reconcile the 
government speech doctrine and the Establishment Clause to ensure 
that the former did not swallow up the latter. 
For his contributions to, and wise cautionary observations about, 




                                                                                                           
 131. Id. at 1141. 
